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ABSTRACT
This article seeks to critically assess the recently dominant
financialized model of corporate law and governance and its
contribution to the creation of the "asocial corporation" geared only to the
enhancement of shareholder value. This article places corporate law in a
wider context of national and international legal developments that,
together, create a framework for the financialization of transnational
corporate activity. This article shows that a new approach to
transnational corporate governance is emerging from a number of
sources. These predate the crisis but have been given impetus by it. In
particular, three important phenomena are examined: the rise of activist
litigation against the parent companies of multinational enterprises
(MNEs) for the actions of overseas subsidiaries; the new framework for
human rights and business developed by the U.N. Special Representative
of the Secretary General; and the increased role of the state as an owner,
controller, and regulator of enterprise as a result of the financial crisis
and the rise of state-owned and -controlled MNEs from newly
industrialized countries. Together, these developments contribute to a
reconsideration of the enhanced shareholder value model and the
development of a more socially rooted appraisal of the corporation and of
corporate law and governance. In addition, new approaches to
international economic law instruments and institutional activities can
further enhance this reform process, and examples of existing and
potential changes are given in the final part.
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INTRODUCTION
The end of the first decade of the twenty-first century was a pivotal
moment in the history of transnational corporate regulation. The decade
began at the height of the neoliberal revolution with its emphasis on
financialization, liberalization, privatization, and deregulation.
Transnational corporate groups were given free choice of means in their
global operations. They could move across borders and adopt whatever
business form they wished when the economic case for doing so suited
them. There were few regulatory burdens placed on them. In return,
states opened their borders so goods, services, and investment could
flow freely. At the same time, states offered prime, state-owned
industries for privatization through foreign inward investment and
reduced barriers to foreign takeovers of privately owned firms.
Furthermore, regulatory activity could be reined in, allowing the market
to control the outcomes. Controls through competition, tax, and
disclosure laws were minimized as they presented a burden for
business.
Yet in 2010, we appear to be entering a new world. Where once the
liberalization and integration of the global economy was the leitmotif of
transnational economic policy, we now hear of increasing concern for
national security, both strategic and economic, and of the need to
protect "national champions." We also see the return of the state as a
controlling owner of industries, particularly in the financial sector. The
rise of new players from the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
adds further emphasis to the role of the state-owned enterprise and
enterprise from the Global (hitherto less developed) South, in world
business.' In addition, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have arisen as
major state-sponsored investors. 2 On the level of private law, we are
seeing the development of new forms of transnational litigation, holding
multinational enterprises (MNEs) accountable for harm caused by their
1. See generally U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT
2006: FDI FROM DEVELOPING AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.06.II.D.11 (2006) [hereinafter WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2006] (discussing in detail companies from the BRICs and other developing home
countries); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, ExTRAcTIVE INDUSTRIES AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Sales
No. E.07.II.D.9 (2007) (focusing on state-owned firms from developing countries in
extractive industries).
2. See Larry Cata Backer, Sovereign Investing in Times of Crisis: Global Regulation of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, State-Owned Enterprises, and the Chinese Experience, 19
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 11-13 (2010) (highlighting how state-owned
enterprises have become major components in the global markets as sovereign investors).
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overseas operations and, at the level of international law, calls for the
extension of human rights responsibilities to corporate actors.
In a word, we are waking up from the thirty-year experiment with
the marketization of the global economy, and we are beginning to ask
for something else. It is the purpose of this article to examine one aspect
of this demand: the issue of private corporate law liability and
accountability of transnational corporate groups. As such, this article
contributes to the understanding of the complex forces that shape
corporate law and which, as Calliess and Zumbansen point out, are
leading to transnationalized, hybrid corporate governance regimes that
are, "characterised by a particular mixture and interaction of public and
private, coordinative and regulatory elements," and which lead to
increasingly flexible governance mechanisms that involve new forms of
"intertwining formal and informal processes of law making."3
First, this article will discuss the nature and extent of the
deregulatory processes that characterize the neoliberal project, which
can be termed "deregulatory globalization," and will examine the role
corporate law has played in this. In this regard, the notion of
globalization as being deregulatory should be understood as referring to
the abolition of regulation that limits corporate freedom of action, as
opposed to facilitative regulation which increases corporate free choice
of means through permissive laws, a key feature of the neoliberal
regulatory order. 4 The article continues by examining the nature and
extent of the changes in policy that allow regulation back in and that
challenge the hitherto dominant discourse of corporate law based on
neoliberal concerns that enhance shareholder value. This perspective
has, to date, retarded avenues of corporate liability and accountability
for harm to various stakeholder groups and individuals other than
shareholders. Finally, the article will show how these changes impact
the development of regulatory possibilities both at the level of liability
and accountability, leading perhaps to a new model of post-crisis
corporate governance, which moves beyond the narrow issue of agency
costs and shareholder protection and which sees the corporation as
rooted in social action and responsibility. I argue that this process may,
in the end, lead to a reevaluation of what is currently understood as
corporate law itself. There is no reason why the model of corporate law,
designed in the nineteenth century and operated in increasing isolation
3. GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING
CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW 193 (2010).
4. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 58-111 (1970) (discussing the terms
"utility" and "responsibility" to denote the facilitative and regulatory aspects of corporate
law in the United States, especially in the period between 1890 and 1970).
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from its wider social reality and impact, should survive in its current
form.
Furthermore, it is not clear that there is some stark choice between
command and control regulation at one extreme and pure voluntarism
and self-regulation at the other. Indeed the process of reevaluation of
corporate law arises out of numerous sources including, but not
exclusively centered on, the state. The process involves a complex mix of
self-regulation, external regulation, interest group lobbying, and private
litigation. In particular, this article will consider litigation strategies
used by lawyers seeking to make MNEs accountable for their overseas
operations; the framework for human rights and business developed by
the U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General on Business
and Human Rights (the Special Representative), John Ruggie; and the
increased role of the state in the process of oversight and ownership of
transnational business entities as illustrations of this multi-sited
process of legal change.
I. DEREGULATORY CORPORATE LAW
The current and still dominant, but arguably socially redundant,
model of corporate law is characterized by a number of features that fit
in with the financialization of the global economy. That process has
entrenched the asocial tendencies inherent in the classical model of the
limited liability joint stock company, the basic tool of modern corporate
law. In this context, the term "asocial" denotes the fact that current
corporate law, especially the Anglo-American model, which is vaunted
by its academic proponents as the most appropriate for the development
of the globalized economy,5 has led to the detachment of the corporation
from its social embeddedness and has created a formal structure that
appears to reinforce an atomistic, self-contained system for the
organization of capital investment. This system recognizes only the
5. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 34-35 (Jeffrey N. Gordon
& Mark J. Roe eds., 2004). See also Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.
EcoN. 1113, 1116 (1998) (proposing that common law countries are more suited to the
development of financial markets because they offer on average better minority
shareholder protection than countries following a civil law tradition); Rafael La Porta et
al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FINANCE 1131, 1132 (1997) (providing
data showing that legal rules of common law countries such as the United States and the
United Kingdom provide more protection for creditors and shareholders as compared to
civil law countries). But see Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A
Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. IN'L ECON. L. 791, 869-70 (2002) (finding that the
above proposition does not withstand closer empirical examination due to other procedural
factors).
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assets involved and their formal owners and managers, allowing for
those running the enterprise the freedom to disregard the social costs of
their actions. These asocial tendencies manifest themselves in a number
of features of classical Anglo-American corporate law.6
First, there is an exaggerated emphasis on the enhancement of
shareholder value as the grundnorm (basic norm) of corporate law and
practice. In the words of Calliess and Zumbansen, "[t]he celebration of
universally accepted shareholder value standards over many years
turned into a triumph over the state's aspiration to regulate the
market," despite the existence of different approaches to the
organization of capitalism that posit differing levels of balance between
limiting and facilitative regulation.7 The fetishization of shareholder
value leads to a mythologization of the shareholder as owner of the
company, even though he or she (or, most commonly, it-a holding
company or institutional investor) is little more than a holder of a right
to residual revenue from the company. Second, the abuse of limited
liability in group structures, especially in regard to the liability of third
party involuntary creditors, allows for the irresponsibility of the parent
company, and other relevant affiliates, in cases where involuntary
creditors have suffered harm as a result of the operations of the group
enterprise. Third, there has been an observable weakening of internal
governance structures due to an increase in the power of managers,
despite the existence of formal rules aimed at the control of such power,
as well as the downgrading of formal auditing and other disclosure
structures so as to render the activities of the corporation less visible.
I will discuss these issues after a preliminary excursus into the
nature and demands of financialization as an ideological process that
leads to the creation of the asocial corporation and is underpinned by a
network of laws at the national and international level that seek to
further the idea of "deregulatory globalization," as well as by advocating
a convergence of corporate law toward the Anglo-American model.
6. The term "asocial corporation" is used in preference to the "antisocial corporation"
which I feel is too emotive a term. See generally JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE
PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER (2004) (regarding the corporation as a
pathological force). For a film documentary based on the book, see Mark Achbar, Jennifer
Abbot, & Joel Bakan, The Corporation, THECORPORATION.COM (2003),
http://www.thecorporation.com/index.cfm?page-id=46 (providing a YouTube link to the
video, divided into 23 parts).
7. CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 3, at 192.
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A. Financialization and Facilitating Globalization through Law
The term "financialization" has been used in many contexts.8 It has
been used to describe the rise of financial markets over traditional bank
lending as the main source of investment capital; the seeking of profits
though financial transactions as opposed to more traditional forms of
manufacturing, services, or primary goods industries; as well as the
changes in corporate governance theory that place enhanced
shareholder value at its heart.9 According to Paddy Ireland, this term
has its historical pedigree in the Marxist concept of finance capital.10
This approach centers on the exploitative aspects of capitalism in the
international economy.11 Building on Marx's theories of the concentration
of capital, labor exploitation, and the division of labor in society,12
subsequent writers have developed theories of monopoly capitalism and
imperialism to explain the operation of international capitalism. 13
The thesis is that the tendency of the national capitalist industry to
move toward monopolization (used here to denote not single firm
dominance but market concentration in general) prompts the export of
capital. The character of the capital exported is significant. It is described
as "finance capital," a term denoting the merger between financial capital
8. See Paddy Ireland, Financialization and Corporate Governance, 60 N. IR. LEGAL Q.
1, 4 (2009).
9. See PAUL H. DEMBINSKI, FINANCE: SERVANT OR DECEIVER? FINANCIALIZATION AT
THE CROSSROADS 1-2, 5-6 (Kevin Cook trans., Palgrave MacMillan 2009) (2008); Greta R.
Krippner, The Financialization of the American Economy, 3 Socio-ECON. REV. 173, 181
(2005). See also Gerald A. Epstein, Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy,
in FINANCIALIZATION AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 3-16 (Gerald A. Epstein, ed., 2005)
(exploring how "financialization" has transformed domestic and international economies);
FINANCIALIZATION AT WORK 24-25 (Ismail Erturk et al. eds., 2008) (discussing the
changing meaning of the term "financialization" and the growing importance of the capital
market).
10. See Ireland, supra note 8, at 5-6.
11. See ANTHONY BREWER, MARXIST THEORIES OF IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL SURVEY 88-
95 (2d ed. Routledge 1990) (1980) (discussing in full the development of the concept of
"finance capital" and its importance to "classical Marxist theories of imperialism"); PETER
T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 92-93 (2d ed. Oxford Univ.
Press 2007).
12. See KARL MARX, CAPITAL VOL. I: THE PROCESS OF CAPITALIST PRODUCTION,
350-368, 612-713 (Frederick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Int'l
Publishers Co. 1967) (1887).
13. See, e.g., RUDOLF HILFERDING, FINANCE CAPITAL: A STUDY OF THE LATEST PHASE
OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 8-10 (Tom Bottomore ed., Morris Watnick & Sam Gordon
trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1981) (1910) (explaining the connection between
"monopolies" and "imperialism"); NIKOLAI BUKHARIN, IMPERIALISM AND WORLD ECONOMY
(1972) (examining facts of the world economy as they relate to imperialism). These
theories were popularized by a pamphlet authored by V. I. Lenin. See V. I. LENIN,
IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM 104-05 (1975).
THE CHANGING FACE OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS GOVERNANCE 671
(money capital dealt with by banks and other financial enterprises) and
industrial capital (capital employed by productive enterprises). This fusion
of concepts, introduced by Hilferding, permits the view that, for the
purposes of international investment, the functions of financing and
controlling the investment can be united in a single enterprise.14 As
Anthony Brewer notes, "if this generalisation of the concept is accepted, it
opens the way to regarding the large multinational companies of today as
part of finance capital,"15 since such companies engage in both of the
abovementioned functions.
Given the role of MNEs as a potent instrument of finance capital, it is
not surprising to see that their activities have encouraged the
financialization of business practices, including the furtherance of
enhanced shareholder value as the cornerstone of corporate conduct.16
This has impacted not only national laws but also the organization of
transnational business law generally. Indeed, in order to fully understand
the limiting functions of corporate law as a means of regulating modern
companies, it is necessary to view this field in a wider legal context.
Company or corporate law does not exist in a vacuum. It is intimately
connected with other fields that, together, provide the legal underpinnings
of the neoliberal global system. Thus, before company law itself is
considered in the next subsection, it is necessary here to list and describe
the other main fields of law that contribute to the development of this
system.
The starting point for this system, as noted above, is to offer the best
conditions for the maximization of returns on investment for the MNE.
This requires the facilitation of firm movement across the global economy
so that it can make the best use of the combination of its ownership-
specific advantages with location-specific advantages in host countries.1 7
In turn, this requires the reduction of investment risk either by way of
protective laws or through insurance. The regulation of labor markets
through labor laws is also a significant element in investment risk
reduction. A further element concerns the finance of investments and
preferential access to capital markets.
In regard to free movement, in addition to easy incorporation through
company law, a matter to be discussed below, the law relating to trade and
investment liberalization plays a significant role. These are issues of
international or regional law.18 At the international level, the existence of
14. See HILFERDING, supra note 13, at 223.
15. BREWER, supra note 11, at 93.
16. See DEMBINSKI, supra note 9, at 113.
17. See generally JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANNA M. LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 79-144 (2d ed. 2008).
18. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 11, at 238-39.
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WTO law seeks to control protectionist tendencies in national trade laws
and practices that operate at the border to limit the penetration of the
local market by competitive imports of goods and services. Such
restrictions can also impede the spread of global production chains that
may rely on reduced barriers to trade for their continued existence. At the
same time, international investment law seeks to remove barriers to entry
and establishment through the extension of principles of
nondiscrimination to the pre-entry phase of an investment. The WTO
system is multilateral and has achieved high levels of acceptance by
states. By contrast, the extension of pre-entry protection to investors
under international investment law has been limited to a number of
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) entered into by the United States
and Canada, and more recently Japan, as well as certain bilateral and
regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). In addition, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) allows for the protection of
nondiscriminatory rights of entry and establishment to service providers
who have a commercial presence in the host country, and it has granted
sectoral access to foreign investors under Article XVI of the GATS. At the
regional level, numerous Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs) contain
rights of entry and establishment. Though not the most dominant
approach of BITs, the increasing use of pre-entry protection in more recent
agreements is significant because it shows a growing trend in investment
liberalization through law. This process has continued despite increased
anxiety over national economic and strategic security, with only a handful
of states currently renouncing their BITs.19
As noted above, investment risk is reduced by way of protective laws,
which ensure the competitive advantage of investors is not undermined by
host countries' regulations. This requires that the internal laws of the host
country both facilitate the investment and protect its economic value. Of
particular importance are the following: first, the protection of the firm's
innovations and brands as proprietary rights; second, the creation of
structures conducive to the growth of large corporations; and third, the
control of local labor markets to ensure favorable costs of labor. The first
task can be met by a system of intellectual property rights protection,
coupled with an effective system of contract law, which can regulate the
use of the firm's property in the hands of a licensee. The protection of
intellectual property rights is reinforced by international law under the
WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement. This entrenches certain protective standards as
19. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, Recent Developments in
International Investment Agreements, IIA MONITOR, no. 3, Mar. 7, 2009, at 1, 6,
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3784&lang-1.
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international obligations that limit state sovereignty in this regard.20 This
is a significant matter given that it is open to debate how far protection of
intellectual property rights is needed to conserve the competitive
advantages of firms with considerable market power such as MNEs or to
further development. 2 1
The second task can be met by laws that allow a large joint stock fund
to be created and an ownership of shares to be held by one company in
another, without restrictions on the nationality of the shareholding
company.22 This may also require the repeal of restrictive national
investment screening laws.23
The third task is a function of labor law, which regulates the
conditions under which employees may be contracted to work. It is an
essential aspect of the economic activity of the enterprise and is intimately
linked with the organization and governance of corporations. 24 Labor laws
20. See SoL PiccioTo, REGULATING GLOBAL CORPORATE CAPITALISM ch. 9
(forthcoming spring 2011) (on file with author).
21. See Sanjaya Lall, The Patent System and the Transfer of Technology to Less-
Developed Countries, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L., no. 1, 1976 at 1, 8-11. See also U.N.
CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEv., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005: TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE INTERNALIZATION OF R&D, at 101-2, U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D. 10
(2005). This report shows that the protection of intellectual property rights might make
little sense given the particular level of technological capability a developing country
enjoys. If the technological functions in the host country are basic, then the presence or
absence of IPR protection is irrelevant. If those functions are imitative and adaptive, then
a regime of strong IRP protection may actually discourage investment as it will cut off the
producer from access to the source technology from which imitation through reverse
engineering occurs.
22. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 11, at 33-34.
23. According to United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
such laws have been progressively liberalized in many, but not all, countries over the
1990s and the early 2000s. However, in recent years some countries have increased
controls over entry and establishment especially on national security grounds. The reader
can find detailed statistics produced on an annual basis in the first chapter of each of the
UNCTAD annual World Investment Reports from 1991 to 2009 and in chapter three,
section A of the 2010 report. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment
Reports 1991-2010, available at http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD
=1485&lang-1 (to view a particular year: click on the year (i.e. "WIR 2008"), click
"Downloads," and then click "Full report").
24. See John W. Cioffi, Governing Globalization? The State, Law, and Structural
Change in Corporate Governance, 27 J.L. & SOC'Y 572, 574 (2000). See also CALLIESS &
ZUMBANSEN, supra note 3, at 190-91 (citing Cioffi with approval). Calliess and Zumbansen
see a gap in scholarship between corporate and labor law, which they say have been living
separate "parallel" lives. Id. at 191. It is apposite to point out that such scholarly linkage
was pioneered as early as the 1960s by Professor Bill Wedderburn, Emeritus Cassell
Professor of Commercial Law at the London School of Economics. He authored the
pioneering work, The Worker and the Law, and was the editor of the leading English law
company law textbook, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, through numerous
editions before he retired. I was fortunate to have studied these linkages with Professor
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may be highly protective of employee rights or they may limit them to
various degrees. In a neoliberal context, the aim of labor law is to ensure
that labor costs are placed at an economically efficient level so as to
increase the enterprise's return on equity.25 Thus the tendency would be to
limit labor rights to the extent possible without compromising basic
international labor standards, as laid down in the ILO Conventions. In
some countries, the imperative to attract mobile international investment
may lead to a curtailment of even the most basic labor rights, creating a
race to the bottom, although the economic case for such restrictions is far
from clear.26 Indeed, it is also arguable that a high level of employee
protection and a guarantee of trade union rights actually ensure a better
investment environment. 27
International investment laws based on BITs with home countries can
supplement the protective function of host country laws. Unlike the
United States BITs, the bulk of Canadian and recent Japanese BITs only
apply to the postentry phase of the investment. Once established, the
investor and the investment28 will enjoy a range of rights over the host
country's authorities. In particular, most agreements will contain a
nondiscrimination standard based on most-favored-nation treatment,
which ensures the same or no less favorable treatment of foreign investors
from different countries, and national treatment, which ensures the same
in relation to domestic investors. In both cases, the investors should be in
like circumstances to benefit from this protection. In addition, many
agreements have a fair and equitable treatment provision, which allows a
review of administrative action against an absolute standard of good
governance based on the investor's legitimate expectations as to the value
of the investment and to the treatment that it should receive.29 In
addition, most BITs contain a provision requiring full and effective
compensation for any taking done in accordance with law, which must be
for a public purpose and nondiscriminatory. More recently, such provisions
have been used to protect investors and investments against regulatory
Wedderburn, who encouraged the inclusion of a chapter on labor relations in my work. See
MUCHLINSKI, supra note 11, at 473.
25. See DEMBINSKI, supra note 9, at 116-17.
26. See BoB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAws AND GLOBAL TRADE 13-15 (2005) (showing the
weaknesses of the economic case for reducing labor standards).
27. Id. at 15-21.
28. These rights are often broadly defined to cover any kind of asset owned or
controlled by the investor. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., SCOPE AND
DEFINITION, at 24-28, U.N. Sales No. E.11.II.D.9 (2011).
29. See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAw 17-24 (2008) (providing an overview of the main elements of BITs); see
also M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 225-76 (2010)
(offering a more critical account of BITs).
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takings in which the title to the asset has remained in the investor's hands
but the economic value of the investment has been drastically reduced as a
result of fiscal or other regulatory measures. Other standards of protection
include protection against loss due to civil unrest or commotion, the free
transfer of capital, and the duty to obey contractual obligations entered
into with the investor.
All of these standards can be enforced through the investor-state
dispute settlement provisions of the BIT. In current practice, an
agreement typically gives the investor the right to choose the method of
dispute settlement. The choice is usually between national or international
dispute settlement systems. In the latter case, a further choice is given
between ad hoc international arbitration and institutional arbitration,
usually under the auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Once the investor has made a choice,
other alternatives are excluded. This freedom has given rise to
considerable concerns in that the investor is given a unilateral right to
exclude national systems of dispute settlement and to internationalize the
dispute with the host country. This may put the settlement of a major
issue, with far reaching consequences for national policy making, into the
hands of international arbitrators who are neither an international court
nor democratically accountable persons. It has led to a view that this
system lacks political legitimacy, unlike that of a court system.30
The threat of political risks, such as expropriation, is a factor that will
increase the perceived costs of investment in a host state. However, these
costs may be reduced if insurance is provided against political risk.31 This
kind of coverage may be available through private insurers, although this
has not always been easy to obtain given the difficulties ofquantifying the
risk involved. Thus, to ensure the availability of political risk coverage, the
governments of capital-exporting states have sponsored public sector or
mixed public/private sector schemes. Such schemes have traditionally
focused on developing host states and have been administered as part of
the home state's foreign aid program, although some schemes, such as the
U.K. Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD), are directed at
foreign trade and investment generally. 32 Therefore, such schemes may be
more than merely an insurance service; they may be an instrument of the
home state's foreign economic and development policy. Such schemes may
also influence the extent of corporate liability for certain types of actions
that harm the environment or threaten the observance of human rights, in
that the allocation of insurance could be made conditional on adequate
30. See generally GUs VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC
LAW (2007) (examining the system of investment treaty arbitration in depth).
31. MUCHLINSKI, supra note 11, at 617.
32. See Export and Investment Guarantees Act, 1991, c. 67, § 1 (U.K.).
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environmental and human rights impact assessments. In addition to
national schemes, the World Bank Convention Establishing the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of 1985 (MIGA) established a
multilateral system for investment insurance against stipulated political
risks in the host state.33
Turning to the facilitation of finance for MNE operations, this can be
met through the liberalization of access to international capital markets.
This has been achieved through market deregulation. In particular, the
ending of restrictive trading practices on the major stock exchanges of the
world in the 1980s and 1990s has led to the globalization of these markets
and the capacity of MNEs to raise capital through global share
issuances.34 In addition, the liberalization of the rules relating to
takeovers has allowed for increased use of the market for corporate control
as a means of entering overseas markets and acquiring valuable capital
assets. The key here is the principle of nonfrustration whereby the
shareholders of a company targeted for takeover can decide whether to
accept a bid for the company regardless of the views of the board.35 A
further issue in relation to capital markets is the role of prudential
regulation. In general, extensive regulatory structures exist both at
national and international levels in this regard.36 However, the major
problem has been one of regulatory failure on the part of the regulators
and culpable noncompliance by the banks, as demonstrated in the collapse
of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1991 and the
more recent banking crisis of 2007 through 2009.37
33. World Bank: Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1598.
34. See PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: MAPPING THE CHANGING CONTOURS OF THE
WORLD ECoNOMY 377-80 (6th ed. 2011).
35. See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW
985-86 (6th ed. 2008); Ireland, supra note 8, at 23. See generally Paul Davies & Klaus
Hopt, Control Transactions, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 225 (Rainer Kraakmann
et. al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) (considering the different legal methods for dealing with problems
that occur when individuals attempt to gain control of a company through the acquisition
of large numbers of voting shares in that company).
36. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 804-45 (2d ed. 2008).
See generally HOWARD DAVIEs & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE
ESSENTIAL GUIDE (2008) (describing in detail the current international system of financial
regulation and offering recommendations for changes to this system).
37. See generally LORD JUSTICE BINGHAM, INQUIRY INTO THE SUPERVISION OF THE
BANK OF CREDIT AND COMMERCE INTERNATIONAL, 1992-3, H.C. 198 (investigating the
systematic failure of regulators to uncover the criminal activity of BCCI); VINCE CABLE,
THE STORM: THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS AND WHAT IT MEANS (2009) (tracing the origins
of the global economic crisis); GILLIAN TErr, FOOL'S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A
SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A
CATASTROPHE (2009) (indicting bankers, regulating agencies, and ratings agencies for
colluding to create a financial system that was doomed to collapse).
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B. Financialization and Corporate Law
Against this wider background, corporate law operates at the national
level to create a system of corporate governance that facilitates freedom of
economic action for the benefit of shareholders. The interaction of
corporate strategy with market organization and stimulus spurred the
evolution of modern corporate governance structures.3 8 This led to the
development of multidivisional corporations and the separation of
ownership and control between managers and shareholders, with the
latter remaining, at best, nominal owners of the company while
controlling power lay with the managers.3 9 It was this effect of corporate
growth that led to the development of agency-based theories of
corporate governance. These theories sought ways of avoiding the
problem that uncontrolled managers may act in their own interests, not
in the best interests of the shareholders, thereby undermining the basic
promise made between the company and its shareholders that the
company would be run in the shareholders' best interests.
Consequently, the main thrust of agency-based theories is the
reduction of agency costs, that is, those costs that arise when managers
fail to act in the best interests of the company and hence of the
shareholders. The principal cost that needs to be controlled is the
misallocation of funds away from the shareholder toward the manager.
Based on the initial promise made between managers and shareholders,
the theory develops a contractual analysis of the enterprise and posits
that it is no more than a nexus of contracts between the managers and
the shareholders. 40 Those contracts aim to protect the shareholders as
the residual risk-bearers of the company. Thus, the main thrust of these
arrangements is to enhance shareholder value. This is justified by the
fact that shareholders take the greatest risks as they have no
contractual guarantee of a return on their investment, unlike voluntary
creditors who have entered into contracts with the company. The main
38. See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN
THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962) (discussing how four major
American corporations dealt with administering their expanding businesses by
decentralizing their corporate structure); ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND:
THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977) (discussing how the
managerial capitalism of the modern business enterprise took the place of market
mechanisms in coordinating the activities of the economy and allocating its resources).
39. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 128-31 (1967).
40. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976)
(arguing that many organizations are a legal construct of overlapping contract
relationships among individuals).
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mechanism for controlling managers in this situation is the market
itself. Inefficient firms will not attract shareholder interest or will lead
to takeovers by more efficient management teams, and so the market
offers the best discipline for managers to run their companies
efficiently.
This theoretical model has been highly influential in the Anglo-
American world. It fits easily with the ideological assumptions of
neoliberalism that have dominated the political scene since the election
of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan at the beginning of the 1980s.
It is also a model open to profound criticism from a corporate law
perspective. In particular, it appears to deny normative force to the
corporate entity itself, whose main commercial and legal purpose is to
replace a myriad of inefficient contractual transactions with a
collectively organized and managed entity, capable of owning and
directing the application of its own capital funds, separate from those of
its owners, for commercial purposes.41 In addition, it makes the
shareholder no longer the formal owner of the company but a mere
contractual claimant.42
The agency approach also has serious implications for any attempt
to add social obligations to the range of corporate duties. First, it can
prevent seeing the corporation as a collective actor based on coordinated
management, and it could justify the rejection of a duty to observe such
wider obligations since corporations are no more than "legal fictions
which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among
individuals."43 Second, an agency approach is likely to see a
commitment to observe social obligations as a threat to shareholder
primacy. Should managers take steps to comply with such obligations,
they can only be doing so by reason of some contractual commitment to
the holders of these rights. As such, this would be an illegitimate
extension of their actions since it would fall outside the range of actions
required to fulfill their agency obligations toward shareholders. It sets
up a competing set of claimants whose risks in relation to the firm are
virtually nonexistent, at least in strict economic terms. The holders of
social claims against the corporation have invested nothing in the
41. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819,820 (1999).
42. Id. at 825.
43. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 40, at 310. The authors define "legal fiction" as "the
artificial construct under the law which allows certain organizations to be treated as
individuals." Id. at 310 n.12. However, this definition is meaningless because corporations
are not individuals but complex collective enterprises. This definition is at odds with, for
example, the organization liability approach taken under the English law of corporate
manslaughter, which clearly establishes the corporate actor as the guilty party, not on the
basis of some fictive personality, but on the basis of its organizational actions.
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company so they cannot require anything from managers, while the
latter have no right to exercise their managerial power to meet such
third party claims. Such is the logic of an agency-based approach.
Where the law externalizes social costs, the result is that managers do
not need to care about social obligations, and shareholders can hold
claims against managers who do, as this would amount to a breach of
duties to the company and indirectly to the shareholders.
These tendencies are indeed observable when it comes to the issue of
making claims against group enterprises. The classical model of the
limited liability joint stock company assumes that the owners are actual
persons who require the corporate form to engage in the risks of
business. 44 It does not contemplate the situation where one company
owns and controls another. This creates special problems in relation to
one class of actors: tort victims, who are often referred to as involuntary
creditors of the company that has caused them injury. Involuntary
creditors have no chance to bargain with the corporation over the
allocation of risks, unlike voluntary creditors, who enter into contracts
with the company. 45 Yet, they may have to bear the risk of loss if the
corporation does not possess sufficient assets to compensate them for
their injuries. This is due to limited liability, which allows only the
actual capital of the company to be used to compensate tort victims. The
assets of the shareholders can only be touched to the extent of the value
of their shares in the company. When the controlling shareholder is
another company, it too benefits from limited liability in the same way
as an individual shareholder. However, this may lead to significant
undercompensation of tort victims, or even no compensation, if the
parent has used the separation between itself and its subsidiary to
insulate itself from liability.
A further example of such asocial corporate law arises out of the
process whereby, in recent years, managers have strengthened their
position in the company by weakening internal corporate governance
structures. For example, this problem lies at the heart of the Enron
scandal.46 Specifically, the key problem lies with the dilution of the
44. Peter Muchlinski, Limited Liability and Multinational Enterprises: A Case for
Reform?, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. EcON. 915, 918 (2010).
45. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1920-21 (1991) (discussing the
differences between involuntary and voluntary creditors and how they allocate risk).
46. See Peter T. Muchlinski, Enron and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and
the Internationalization of Governance and Disclosure Regimes, 37 CONN. L. REV. 725,
726-35 (2005) (summarizing the main reasons for Enron's collapse). See generally John C.
Coffee Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 269, 302 (2004) (discussing a wide variety of explanations for the
corporate governance failures of 2001 to 2002).
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separation of roles between managers, shareholders, and finance
officers within the company. As more managers became shareholders in
their companies as a result of stock option schemes comprising part or
all of their remuneration, the apparent conflict of interest between
manager and shareholder, traditionally embodied in the agency costs
approach to corporate governance, apparently disappeared. 47 Managers
and shareholders were now on the same side and wanted the same
thing-the highest possible share prices. Thus, the company director's
principal duty was to act in the best interests of the company-that is,
in the best interests of the shareholder- which became a duty to act in
his or her own interests! This resulted in the very high remuneration
packages that have been the focus of considerable public criticism,
whether in financial or other companies. 48 In the United States, this
trend was furthered by regulatory changes in the 1990s that offered tax
deductions for performance-based compensation of corporate directors,
encouraging the use of stock options as a principal means of
remuneration. In addition, Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
accounting rules did not require companies to include options as an
expense. A proposed change to these rules was overturned by the U.S.
Senate in 1994, allowing such payment packages to be effectively free on
the corporate balance sheet.49
The perverse incentives of stock options resulted in a more cavalier
attitude among company directors toward anything other than the
short-term value of their share price, inducing them to cut corners on
corporate governance compliance where this could affect the rise in
short-term share values.50 In the Enron case, this led to out-and-out
fraud and a failure to observe any duty to serve the interest of the
company, which predictably collapsed as soon as the full extent of these
actions became known.5 1 It also led to the reduction of information
offered to the board, thereby restricting the ability of the nonexecutive
directors to act in their capacity as internal watchdogs over the
executive directors. 52
47. See Ireland, supra note 8, at 19.
48. See id.
49. See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: How DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS 155-57 (rev. ed., Public Affairs 2009) (2003).
50. See id. at 211-14; DEMBINSKI, supra note 9, at 114-15.
51. See PARTNOY, supra note 49, at 294-96, 346-47; Coffee, supra note 46, at 275-79;
Muchlinski, supra note 46, at 728.
52. For more on the problems of nonexecutive directors on boards of Anglo-American
companies, see MUCHLINSKI, supra note 11, at 342-44 (discussing how the independent
nature of nonexecutive directors and the requirement that nonexecutive directors meet
separately as a group could encourage a policy of nondisclosure to the board, thus limiting
the ability of the nonexecutive directors to be internal watchdogs).
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In regard to finance officers, they should act as the first line of
defense against inaccurate accounting. However, the Enron case and
other accounting scandals show that these financial officers could not
prevent the scandals.5 3 This is intimately linked to the way in which
international businesses like Enron have changed. In the first place, so
as to reduce overall operating costs, many companies have cut their
finance departments as routine finance functions, such as payroll,
benefits, and expenses, have been outsourced. As a result, the role of
finance officers has changed from that of an accountant and controller of
historic business costs to a strategic financial analyst of future business
opportunities. Thus, their role has become more closely linked to that of
the executive officers and their projects. When coupled with significant
change in corporate business functions, as in the case of Enron moving
into new energy trading activities, finance officers are actively engaged
in completely new sets of financial issues and in ensuring effective
financial performance in these circumstances. Thus, finance officers at
Enron were active in developing many of the financial techniques used
to inflate the value of Enron's trading activities, thereby losing sight of
their responsibilities as financial controllers. Ensuring the return of
finance officers to such a role is key to avoiding the types of managerial
excesses that characterized the Enron case and other accounting
scandals.
As an alternative to the Anglo-American unitary board structure,
companies in Germany have a two-tier board.54 Arguably, this makes
the executive directors more accountable, as the supervisory board has
oversight and is separate from the management board. However, the
problem of executive director accountability does not disappear by use of
the two-tier board model. It is as equally possible for a determined chief
executive to keep a supervisory board in the dark as it is for a unitary
board. For example, when Daimler Benz and Chrysler merged in May
1998, Jurgen Schrempp, the Daimler Benz chief executive at the time,
only informed the supervisory board of the German company the day
before the merger was announced, while the unitary board of Chrysler
learned of the plan in February 1998 and discussed negotiations
throughout.5 5 Ahold had a two-tier board structure, but this did not
53. See Muchlinski, supra note 46, at 761-62. See also Robert Howell, How Accounting
Executives Looked the Wrong Way, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug.13, 2002, at 11 (discussing
how financial officers failed to prevent the aggressive accounting and reporting practices
by their companies).
54. See MADs ANDENAS & FRANK WOOLDRIDGE, EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE COMPANY
LAw 297-320 (2009). The two-tier board is also an optional structural choice for companies
in France and the Netherlands, as opposed to a single board. Id. at 286, 368.
55. The Way We Govern Now, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at 61, 62.
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prevent the accounting abuses that arose in the course of its
operations.56 Nor has the two-tier structure prevented the development
of a culture of accommodation between the supervisory and
management boards of European companies following this approach.
For example, the trial in Germany of certain Mannesmann directors
revealed a willingness on the part of nonexecutive directors to approve
pay packages for executive directors, arising out of the takeover of
Mannesmann by Vodafone, which German prosecutors regarded as
illegal. The accused, of which four were nonexecutive directors, were
acquitted in July 2004, but a retrial of the case was ordered in 2005.67
The case ended in a settlement whereby the defendants agreed to pay
substantial fines without any admission of guilt.58 Indeed, the OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance assert that "there is no single model
of good corporate governance," and "they do not advocate any particular
board structure and the term 'board' as used in [the] document is meant
to embrace different national models of board structures found in OECD
and non-OECD countries."59
Such internal governance failures are supposed to be reduced by the
existence of external governance mechanisms. In particular, the
auditing function and the regulatory oversight of the corporation by
state regulatory agencies, especially in relation to the issue of securities
and tax liability, should ensure transparency and clarity in the overall
picture of the corporation's activities. Unfortunately, these functions
have also failed in the race to secure the greatest financial return from
the corporate system.60 Most notably in the Enron case, the auditor,
Arthur Andersen, authorized accounts that failed to show a true and
fair view of the company's situation. In particular, the use of off-balance
sheet entities, into which Enron debt was poured and which were set up
56. See Europe's Enron, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2003, at 63, 64.
57. See Patrick Jenkins, Appeal Lodged Against Trial Acquittals, FIN. TIMES (London),
July 24, 2004, at 6; Patrick Jenkins, Court Clears Bosses over Bonuses, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 23, 2004, at 28; Mark Landler, Top Banker to be Retried in Germany, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 22, 2005, at C21.
58. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 21, 2005, 50
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 331 (F.R.G.), available
at http://www.hrr-strafrecht.de/hrr/3/043-470-04.php; Bernard Black et al., Legal
Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 2: Court Procedures, Indemnification
and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal Liability (Report to the Russian
Securities Agency), COLUM. BUs. L. REV., 2008, at 1, 145-46.
59. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance, at 13 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf.
60. See generally A. LARRY ELLIOTT & RICHARD J. SCHROTH, How COMPANIES LIE: WHY
ENRON IS JUST THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG (2002) (arguing that the Enron disaster
exemplifies the dire need for corporate law reform); PARTNOY, supra note 49 (discussing
the various financial scandals that led to the 2008-2009 financial crisis).
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with the active cooperation of third parties who formally, but not
actually, controlled them, was approved. This was done because the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accepted such accounting
practices in principle.
In addition, the SEC accepted the principle of mark-to-market
accounting, which permits the full, projected future value of a futures
trading transaction to be displayed on the balance sheet, rather than
the actual periodic historical earnings on the transaction as it
progresses. In response to Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United
States introduced reforms in auditing practice, a prohibition on auditors
also serving as financial consultants to the companies they audit, and
strict criminal penalties for noncompliance. 6' By contrast, in the United
Kingdom, the Combined Code of Corporate Governance retains the
voluntary "comply or explain" standard, which leaves to the company
the decision whether to follow the requirements of the Combined Code
and explain its reasons in its annual report.62
II. CHALLENGES TO DEREGULATORY CORPORATE LAw
Law has played a significant part in the process of financialization
and deregulation of corporate activities. The wider environment for
corporate action has been increased through international trade and
investment liberalization measures; the competitive advantages of firms
have been secured through intellectual property and contract laws; the
freedom of establishment has been eased by permissive corporate laws
and the removal of restrictive investment screening laws in many
countries; and company and securities law has allowed for, or perhaps
more accurately ignored, changes in internal corporate governance that
further entrench the financialization of corporate actions. However, this
approach is called into questioned by a number of challenges to the
deregulatory model of corporate law.
These challenges do not uniquely come from within company law.
Indeed, company law remains largely rooted in its enhanced
shareholder value straightjacket, at least in the Anglo-American
world.63 Equally, the much misunderstood, but apparently more socially
61. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 11, at 349-50.
62. Id. at 347-48.
63. See Jonathan Rickford, A History of the Company Law Review, in THE REFORM OF
UNITED KINGDOM COMPANY LAw 23-24 (John de Lacy ed., 2002) (discussing how the
Company Law Review rejected wider stakeholder-oriented company law reforms as seen
in the Companies Act of 2006). The Companies Act is an example of "enlightened
shareholder value" because directors can take into account a wider range of issues when
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responsible, German model appears to be most notable for its retreat in
recent years from its underpinning regulatory assumptions based on a
social conception of the corporation and for its political desire to better
emulate the Anglo-American model. 64 Nonetheless, the reaction to
Enron and other similar scandals in the early twenty-first century has
created a culture of renewed interest in regulatory oversight for
companies, which has been seen in the recent financial crisis. However,
this is difficult to reconcile with the neoliberal demand for an open and
deregulated corporate environment. In Europe, the compromise has
been to use the more self-regulatory approach of English and EU Law,
while the approach in the United States has been geared more toward
mandatory regulation.65
According to Calliess and Zumbansen, these imperatives are
creating a process of transnationalization of corporate governance
reform that is "characterised by its 'spatial' character, both with regard
to its normative scope and its institutional origin."66 This section of the
article offers further evidence of this process and shows that some of the
most important challenges come from fields of law and policy action,
going beyond traditional national laws and corporate law itself. Thus,
the challenge of corporate liability is being met by entrepreneurial
public interest lawyers who are devising new forms of corporate liability
litigation that seek to prove that the logic of company law should not
prevent third parties from seeking redress through tort law or criminal
law for certain classes of corporate wrongs, including human rights
violations. Second, the U.N. Special Representative's framework for
business and human rights shows that corporations may well have
wider social responsibilities, including the observance of human rights,
hitherto the exclusive concern of states. Third, in response to the global
financial crisis and as a result of the rise of new state-owned MNEs
from the BRICs, state ownership has resurfaced as a factor to be
considered in the corporate law and governance universe. These
acting to further the success of their company including "the impact of the company's
operations on the community and the environment." See further text at page 699 below.
64. See Ren6 Reich-Graefe, Changing Paradigms: The Liability of Corporate Groups in
Germany, 37 CONN. L. REV. 785, 785-87 (2005) (discussing the shift from the "qualified
concern" doctrine toward veil-piercing approaches in relationship to group liability);
LEIsTIKOw, DAS NEUE GMBH-RECHT 1-17 (2009) (discussing reform of the more restrictive
elements of incorporation under GmbH-Recht in response to competitive pressures from
simpler incorporation laws in other EU countries, notably England, in the light of
European court rulings allowing freedom of incorporation across the European Union).
65. See Muchlinski, supra note 46, at 743; CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 3, at
194-227 (discussing the German Corporate Governance Code and EU approaches to
corporate governance).
66. CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 3, at 212.
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developments strike at the heart of what asocial company law is doing
and argue for a reunification between the company and society in law as
well as in fact.
A. The Challenge of Corporate Liability
In the previous section, it was shown how the logic of corporate
personality and limited liability restricts liability to third parties. This
effect of company law has been criticized on the ground that it
externalizes a risk that ought properly to be held by the company.
Instead, the risk is passed to the involuntary creditor. This is wrong
because the poorer risk taker assumes the burden of the risk, contrary to
well understood notions of efficient risk allocation.67 The logic of company
law externalizes the risk of liability away from the controlling interest by
insulating it from liability except in the few cases where it can be shown
that it has a direct involvement in the events leading to the violation. This
position is reinforced by the highly restrictive conditions under which an
Anglo-American judge will "pierce the corporate veil" and find the parent
directly responsible for the acts of the subsidiary. Current law only
permits this in cases of abuse of the corporate form. This excludes most
tort cases where the parent is not directly involved in the course of events
leading to the harm but is aware of the general situation, or ought to be so
aware, but fails to prevent the harm from materializing. In these
instances, "it may only be possible to hold the parent liable by showing
that it was in actual control of the events that led to the injury and the
resulting claims for compensation."68
Recent practice in both common law and civil law jurisdictions shows
that there is a growing willingness among activist lawyers and NGOs to
bring such claims against parent companies in their home countries.69
Such claims first arose in the United States and other common law
jurisdictions and have become known as foreign direct liability claims.70
67. See Nina A. Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach to Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1217-25 (2002).
68. Muchlinski, supra note 44, at 919.
69. See Peter Muchlinski, The Provision of Private Law Remedies Against
Multinational Enterprises: A Comparative Law Perspective, 4 J. COMP. L., no. 2, 2009, at
148. My thanks to Brian Hill of Wildy, Simmonds and Hill Publishing for permission to
reproduce material from this article.
70. See Halina Ward, Governing Multinationals: The Role of Foreign Direct Liability,
18 ROYAL INST. INT'L AFF. 1 (2001), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/
files/3028_roleoffdl.pdf. According to Ward, foreign direct liability is defined as "[a] new
wave of legal actions in the UK, US, Canada and Australia [that] aims to hold parent
companies legally accountable in developed country courts for negative environmental,
health and safety, labour or human rights impacts associated with the operations of
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The origins of foreign direct liability litigation emerged from two sets of
cases starting in the 1990s. 71 First, there were the U.S. cases brought
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) that centered on alleged
violations of human rights by corporate actors through their foreign
operations. Second, a series of cases, brought before U.K., Canadian,
and Australian courts, sought to hold the parent company accountable
before the courts of the home state for wrongs committed by its
subsidiaries abroad. Here, the emphasis was not so much on human
rights abuses, though they may be an aspect of the case, but rather on
civil law, especially tort liability under the laws of the home state.
The common law origin of such cases appears to be rooted in a
number of culturally specific factors. American lawyers, and to a lesser
extent their English, Australian, and Canadian counterparts, see legal
practice in more entrepreneurial terms than lawyers who are steeped in
the civilian tradition, who see themselves more as political actors
dedicated to the defense of the public interest. 72 Equally, the adversary
system of justice encourages the placing of the interests of the client
first and hands control over the presentation of evidence to the lawyers
rather than to the court, as is the case in civilian systems.73 Both
systems tend to give lawyers in these countries a sense of initiative to
develop their own cases.
A further important factor arises from the fact that most of the
leading NGOs concerned about corporate social responsibility were
founded in the Anglo-American world. They have been at the forefront
of activism in relation to foreign direct liability. 74 Perhaps the best
example is the U.K.-based Corporate Responsibility Coalition (CORE)
members of their corporate family in developing countries. These 'foreign direct liability'
claims represent the flip side of foreign direct investment. They complement campaigners'
calls for minimum standards for multinational corporations by testing the boundaries of
existing legal principles, rather than by calling for new regulation." Id. See also
Muchlinski, supra note 46, at 745.
71. See Ward, supra note 70, at 2.
72. See Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Preface to LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF
WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM 13 (Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997)
(identifying a new American model of legal practice after World War II that is strongly
favored throughout the world due to the United States' economic and political influence
and the energetic entrepreneurialism of U.S. lawyers). This influence is seen in particular
in the building of market-based legal solutions to economic globalization but less so in
relation to political and constitutional issues. A good example of this entrepreneurial
domination is the prevalence of U.S. and UK law firms in international investor-state
arbitration. See id.
73. See Stephen Gillers, The American Legal Profession, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
AMERICAN LAW 151, 166-68 (Alan B. Morrison ed., 1996).
74. See MICHAEL YAZIJI & JONATHAN DOH, NGOS AND CORPORATIONS: CONFLICT AND
COLLABORATION 26-31 (2009).
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formed in 2000. It aims to make changes in U.K. company law to
"minimise companies' negative impacts on people and the environment
and to maximise companies' contribution to sustainable societies." 75
Members of CORE include Amnesty International, Action Aid, Friends
of the Earth, Traidcraft, War on Want, and WWF (U.K.). The main
themes of the CORE's work include "the need for greater corporate
accountability of key decision makers in companies, the importance of
openness and transparency and better access to justice for victims of
corporate abuse."76 In this connection, CORE advocates the reform of
English law to further accommodate foreign direct liability through
changes in statutory obligations of corporations and through
litigation.77 A similar strategy was undertaken in Canada where a
private member's bill, Bill C-300 entitled "An Act respecting Corporate
Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas in Developing
Countries," sought to establish a ministerial reporting procedure before
Parliament under which the human rights and environmental
standards compliance of Canadian companies in the energy and natural
resources industry would come under scrutiny.78 By mid-June 2010, the
bill had passed through first and second readings and through
committee hearings. Bill C-300 went to a third reading and a final vote
in October 2010 and was defeated by just six votes.79
Foreign direct liability litigation is also now appearing in civil law
jurisdictions. In recent years, under the leadership of the human rights'
NGO Sherpa, a number of cases have been commenced against French
MNEs for alleged violations of human rights by their overseas
subsidiaries.80 However, the validity of foreign direct liability claims
75. FTSE100 Company Reports Reveal Inadequacy of Companies Act, CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY, http://corporate-responsibility.org/about/ (last visited May 11, 2011).
76. Id.
77. See CORE COALITION, THE REALITY OF RIGHTS: BARRIERS TO ACCESSING REMEDIES
WHEN BUSINESS OPERATES BEYOND BORDERS 5-6 (2009), available at http://corporate-
responsibility.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/reality-of rights.pdf.
78. Corporate Accountability of Mining, Oil and Gas Corporations in Developing
Countries Act, H.C. 2009, c. 300 (Can.).
79. Liezel Hill, Canadian Lawmakers Vote Down Controversial Bill C-300, MINING
WEEKLY (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.miningweekly.comlarticle/canadian-mps-vote-against-
bill-c-300-2010-10-28.
80. See L'association, SHERPA, http://www.asso-sherpa.org/association/notre-mission
(last visited Apr. 2, 2011) (explaining Sherpa's mission of protecting and defending victims
of economic crimes through legal action). Claims were lodged in 2002 against Rougier in
respect of alleged corrupt practices in Cameroon, but were dismissed by the Paris Court of
Appeal on February 13, 2004, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the parent
company for the acts of its subsidiary. Claims were lodged against Total arising out of its
involvement in the construction of the Yadana pipeline in Burma. Investigations are being
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remains uncertain in France. Civilian legal systems generally view a
criminal trial and conviction as the requisite basis for compensation in
grave human rights abuse cases.81 Equally, in the recent Lipietz
litigation, a case concerning the extent to which the French national
railway company, SNCF, and the French government could be held
responsible for complicity in the deportation of French Jews during
World War II, the liability of both was accepted at first instance, but
SNCF's liability was overturned on appeal.82 The Conseil d'Etat upheld
the Administrative Court of Appeals on the ground that the tribunal of
first instance lacked jurisdiction to hear a civil claim against SNCF,
which was, at the relevant time, a mixed-economy entity exercising both
public and commercial functions, and on the ground that it was acting
under orders as the Court of Appeals had correctly concluded.83
More recently, in the Netherlands, victims of oil pollution from
Shell's installations in Nigeria, in conjunction with Milieudefensie
(Friends of the Earth Netherlands), have started legal proceedings
against Shell Nigeria and Royal Dutch Shell PLC, its parent company.84
The claimants allege that Shell Nigeria is liable for the pollution as the
operator of the relevant plants in the Niger Delta, while Royal Dutch
Shell is liable as the parent company and is therefore responsible for
preventing environmental damage on the part of its subsidiary. This
principle of liability is supported, according to the claimants, in other
legal systems, especially in U.S. and English law, as well as under
Dutch law and under international standards contained in international
soft law instruments such as the OECD Guidelines on Multinational
conducted with a view to future litigation in a number of new cases. See Muchlinski, supra
note 69, at 160.
81. See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Gobalization [sic], Legal Transnationalization and
Crimes Against Humanity: The Lipietz Case, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 363, 379 (2008).
82. See Le tribunal administratif [regional administrative court of first instance] TA
Toulouse, June 6, 2006, 0104248 (Fr.), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/
Does/NLP/France/Lipietzjugement_6-6-2006.pdf (for an unofficial English translation of
the Lipietz case by Anne Witt, J.D. and legal translator, as revised by Vivian Grosswald
Curran, Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh, visit
http://www.acaccia.fr/IMG/pdflJudgmentLipietzenglish.pdf); Curran, supra note 81, at
363-64.
83. Madame Lipietz and others for the Counseil d'Etat reasoned that the
administrative court of appeals had not erred in its finding that the administrative court
of Toulouse lacked jurisdiction because SNCF was a company endowed with a mission of
public service and was acting in convention thereof and not in its modern commercial
purpose. Conseil d'Etat [highest administrative court], CE, Nov. 28, 2007, 305966, Mme.
L. et autres, available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/cde/node.php?articleid=1485.
84. See Factsheet for The People of Nigeria Versus Shell: The Course of the Lawsuit,
MILIEUDEFENSIE (Dec. 2009), http://wwwl.milieudefensie.nl/english-/publications/The%
20course%20of%20the%20lawsuit.pdf.
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Enterprises and the U.N. Global Compact and Global Reporting
Initiative. 8 5 On December 30, 2009, the Civil Court of the Hague ruled
that the claimants had the right to bring the case before a Dutch
court.8 6 This is the first time a Dutch court has accepted jurisdiction
over a foreign direct liability claim.
Foreign direct liability may be seen as an antidote to one of the
more undesirable results of a shareholder primacy model of corporate
law. With its emphasis on the total legal separation between the
shareholder and the corporation, the shareholder primacy model
permits the shareholder to escape responsibility for wrongs committed
by the company in which it holds a stake. It is the very aim of foreign
direct liability litigation to subvert this assumption and to render the
controlling interest liable for the acts of its subsidiary, especially as the
parent and subsidiary are in economic terms a single enterprise. Indeed,
even when the shareholder is a natural person, it is strongly arguable
that he or she should also bear some measure of responsibility for
corporate wrongs if he or she is to enjoy the benefits of shareholder
rights in the company.8 7
Equally, with its transnational qualities of "legal sampling,"88 this
development challenges the idea that transnational corporate actors can
benefit from different levels of liability in different jurisdictions.
Litigation strategies are increasingly used as part of a wider political
strategy to mobilize opposition to the social and political effects of
globalization on local communities. This has resulted in what de Sousa
Santos has termed "subaltern cosmopolitan legality," the process by
which excluded and marginalized groups use existing laws in a
counterhegemonic way to undermine the dominance of institutions and
practices that seek to further the interests of the minority of social
actors who benefit from globalization.89 One part of such a strategy is to
85. Oruma Subpoena of 2008 203-228, available in English at
http://www.milieudefensie.nl/globalisering/publicaties/infobladen/Scan%20dagvaarding%2
00ruma%20Engels.pdf.
86. Oruma v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC (Nig. v. Neth.), Dec. 30, 2009, (Hague Ct.),
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/default.aspx (input BK8616 for LJN).
87. See Paddy Ireland, Limited Liability, Shareholder Rights and the Problem of
Corporate Irresponsibility, 34 CAMBRIDGE J. ECONOMICS 837 (2008) (discussing the history
of limited liability and the creation of the doctrine of separate corporate personality).
88. Legal sampling occurs when activist lawyers build upon the experiences of other
jurisdictions and attempt to develop forms of foreign direct liability suitable to their own
jurisdictional realities.
89. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE 180-81 (2002).
See Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cdsar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, Law, Politics, and the
Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW:
TOWARDS A CosMoPoLiTAN LEGALITY 1, 12-18 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cdsar A.
Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005).
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2
further litigation against MNEs either in the host country, where the
alleged wrongs have taken place, or in the home country of the parent,
emphasizing the responsibility that comes from the operation of an
integrated transnational enterprise regardless of the formal corporate
separation between parent and subsidiaries.
B. The Challenge of Human Rights Responsibility
The global economic crisis has created a situation in which those
affected by the crisis become more vulnerable than ever to potential harm
caused by human rights abuses. This includes abuses suffered at the
hands of corporate actors. According to Special Representative Ruggie:
Markets can be highly efficient means for allocating
scarce resources, and powerful forces for promoting
social objectives ranging from poverty alleviation to the
rule of law. But for markets to work optimally they must
have adequate institutional underpinnings and be
embedded in the broader values of social community. All
along [the Special Representative] has stressed that
these governance gaps "create the permissive
environment within which blameworthy acts by
corporations may occur without adequate sanctioning or
reparation." [The Special Representative] employed this
framing to explain the state of business and human
rights. We now know it holds for the world political
economy as a whole.90
This is a direct challenge to the asocial corporation. Indeed, in his
2008 Report to the Human Rights Council, Special Representative
Ruggie made clear that the failure of companies to meet their
responsibility to respect human rights,
can subject companies to the courts of public opinion -
comprising employees, communities, consumers, civil
society, as well as investors - and occasionally to charges
in actual courts. Whereas governments define the scope
of legal compliance, the broader scope of the
responsibility to respect is defined by social expectations
90. U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Towards
Operationalizing the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, 1 7, U.N. Doc.
AIHRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Business and Human Rights].
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- as part of what is sometimes called a company's social
licence to operate.9 1
Thus the Special Representative clearly sees a social context for the
operations of corporate investors in host countries-a social license to
operate.
The main means by which corporations are to exercise their
responsibility to respect human rights is through the application of a
due diligence mechanism to human rights risk assessment. This
requires the company to move from being a victim of "naming and
shaming" to "knowing and showing" that they understand and
internalize human rights through due diligence. 92 The main elements of
due diligence include: a full human rights policy, periodic assessments
of human rights impacts, and proper control and reporting systems that
stress effective corporate grievance procedures. Special Representative
Ruggie has stressed that this is not like other commercial due diligence
processes, which are in the main transactional processes, as there is a
constant need to engage in communication with the right-holders.93 In
other words, the firm must look beyond the protection of its own
interests and focus on the interests of those it affects by its actions. 94
The legal implications of due diligence are also considered. In
particular, Special Representative Ruggie has argued that properly
conducted due diligence will provide strong protection against
mismanagement claims by shareholders and give proof that the
company took every reasonable step to avoid a violation, which should
count in its favor in litigation.95 However, the Special Representative
has rejected the notion that human rights due diligence should
automatically absolve the company from liability under, for example,
the Alien Tort Claims Act in the United States.96
The introduction of a responsibility to respect human rights and the
development by companies of a human rights due diligence mechanism,
as suggested by the Special Representative, may also result in certain
reforms of corporate organization. In particular, the development of
human rights compliance systems and managerial structures to achieve
91. U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a
Framework for Business and Human Rights, 1 54, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008).
92. U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Further
Steps Toward the Operationalization of the 'Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework:
Special Report of the Secretary-General, 80, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010)
[hereinafter Ruggie Report].
93. Id. at $ 85.
94. Id. at 81.
95. Id. at $ 86.
96. Id.
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this may become a feature of the reformed human rights oriented "civil
corporation."97 The introduction of managerial obligations to perform
human rights due diligence is also likely to develop into a binding legal
duty of care under tort law for both management and the corporation
and will be a significant addition to the protection of involuntary
creditors.98 It will recognize that they have an unanswerable moral
claim to consideration in corporate decision making based on the
established and evolving standards of corporate responsibility in both
national and international law. 99
C. The Challenge of Direct State Involvement in and with Corporations
The impact of state involvement in corporate action is extensive.
Indeed it is arguable that without the state the capitalist system cannot
function. 00 The real question is how extensively the state should be
involved, which is an issue of balance, not of alternatives, between the
state and the market.10 In recent years, the state is said to have
retreated from the economy, whether through the privatization of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), through deregulation or market
liberalization. This is both a domestic and an international process. 102
Yet, in recent years, the state has moved back into the economic fray as
an owner of enterprises, an investor, and a regulator. As noted at the
beginning of this article, this is in part a forced response to the financial
crisis but is also indicative of an increased number of SOEs that are also
MNEs from the BRICs and other newly globalizing economies, as well
as the increased presence of SWFs as investment vehicles. It is not
possible to cover all the implications of these developments here.
Rather, the emphasis will be on how the increased role of the state
affects the further development of transnational corporate governance.
This will be considered by way of a study of the U.K. policy of state
97. See SIMON ZADEK, THE CIVIL CORPORATION 36-41 (rev. ed. 2007).
98. See Peter Muchlinski, Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights
Proposals: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance and Regulation, Bus. ETHICS Q.
(forthcoming 2011).
99. On which, see further Wesley Cragg, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Theory, 12
Bus. ETHICS Q. 113 (2002).
100. See DICKEN, supra note 34, 169-220 (discussing that although the role of the state
has changed, it still plays a significant role in the economy). The state plays four key roles:
(1) containers of distinctive institutions and practices, (2) regulators of economic activities
and transactions, (3) competitors with other states, and (4) collaborators with other states.
101. See Martin Kettle, Problems This Big Need More Than the State v Market Stuff,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 20, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2009/mar/20/climate-change-politics-capitalism?INTCMP=SRCH#box.
102. See MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 61-67 (2004).
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shareholding in the banking sector and by consideration of the impact of
SOE activities in the global economy.
In response to the banking crisis that occurred from 2007 to 2009,
the U.K. government acquired controlling interests in failing banks. It
outright nationalized Northern Rock and the Bradford and Bingley,
while the rescue of Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds
TSB/HBOS resulted in an eighty-three percent government
shareholding in the former and a forty-one percent shareholding in the
latter. 0 3 These full or partial state holdings of stock are in the hands of
a special company set up by the British government, U.K. Financial
Investments Ltd. (UKFI).104 UKFI defines itself as,
a Companies Act Company, with HM Treasury as its
sole shareholder. The company's activities are governed
by its board, which is accountable to the Chancellor of
the Exchequer and-through the chancellor-to
Parliament. Membership of the UKFI board comprises a
private sector Chair, non-executive private sector
members, a Chief Executive and senior Government
officials. 05
The operation of UKFI is governed by a shareholder relationship
framework document concluded between the company and HM
Treasury.106 The most significant element of this framework is that,
unlike traditional nationalizations of the past, its aim is to return the
state shareholding in the banks to the private sector as soon as
possible.107 With this aim in mind, UKFI will draw up an "investment
mandate" that will seek to create the best return for taxpayers in the
103. See UK FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS LTD., ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS 2009/10,
H.C. 312, at 19, 24. See also N. Jansen Calamita, The British Bank Nationalizations: An
International Law Perspective, 58 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 119 (2009) (explaining the
international legal implications of these nationalizations).
104. See About Us, UK FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS LTD., http://www.ukfi.co.uk (last visited
Mar. 21, 2011).
105. Id.
106. UK FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS LTD., SHAREHOLDER RELATIONSHIP FRAMEWORK
DOCUMENT 1 (rev. 2009), http://www.ukfi.co.uk/releases/Framework%20Document
%20July%20Revised%20Version.pdf.
107. Id. at 1 3.1 ("The Company should, in compliance with the Investment Mandate
described in Section 4 (The Investment Mandate), develop and execute an investment
strategy for disposing of the Investments in an orderly and active way through sale,
redemption, buy-back or other means within the context of an overarching objective of
protecting and creating value for the taxpayer as shareholder and, where applicable, as
provider of financial support, paying due regard to the maintenance of financial stability
and to acting in a way that promotes competition.").
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management of the state-held and -controlled banks. 108 The relationship
between the UKFI and the banks is like a commercial investment
manager and not like an executive manager involved in the day-to-day
affairs of the banks. In the case of the wholly-owned banks, the role is
carried out
in a manner similar to that in which a financial sponsor
would engage with a wholly-owned portfolio company.
The Company will, in addition to the rights attaching to
the Investments in these companies but subject to the
other provisions of this Framework Document, exercise
all rights and discretions conferred on the Company
under the applicable Investee Company Framework
Document.109
Two overriding objectives inform the corporate governance of UKFI
and its operation of the state shareholdings in the banks: the avoidance
of anticompetitive practices and the appropriate management of conflict
and insider information. To this end, there are controls over cross-
directorships in state-owned and -controlled banks, barriers to inside
information leaks between the banks, and compliance procedures for
financial services regulation.110 In addition, UKFI has powers to
"develop a robust assurance regime for monitoring and securing
compliance with the Business Plans and Investee Company Conditions,
and will regularly discuss its approach with HM Treasury and report on
compliance to HM Treasury."111
This structure has arisen as a response to crisis. Thus, it is not an
ideologically inspired policy, unlike the mass nationalizations under the
Atlee government of 1945 through 1951, which were described as the
Labour Party's "long-standing electoral aims being translated into
legislation."112 However, the U.K. banking sector will face the same
dangers of politicization as the earlier nationalized industries. Indeed,
the question remains whether UKFI should insist that the banks under
its control act as social investors, helping to create new jobs and
industries, or whether it can credibly continue to oversee a purely
commercial operation, aimed at early reprivatization, which may again
reproduce the excesses and lack of due diligence that led to the financial
crisis in the first place.
108. See id. 4 (explaining terms and conditions of the Investment Mandate).
109. Id. I 7.2(A).
110. Id. 7.3.
111. Id. 8.2.
112. CENTO VEIAANOVSKI, SELLING THE STATE: PRIVATISATION IN BRITAIN 54 (1988).
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The call for a more socially oriented financial sector is exemplified
by a recent campaign run by the Green Investment Bank Commission to
reorganize RBS into a government-sponsored Green Investment Bank
(GIB) or Royal Bank of Sustainability. 113 It is argued that the
government should not miss this opportunity to redefine the role of
banks in society and avoid the possible return to short-termism. 114
Given that at least £200 billion has to be invested in U.K. energy
infrastructure in the next ten to fifteen years, and that this sector could
generate many new jobs, the GIB could lead the way and provide the
financing for this. The new Coalition Government has indicated in the
Coalition Government Agreement of May 12, 2010, that they would
support the creation of a GIB.115 From a corporate governance
perspective, this proposal contains a major problem. While eighty-three
percent of the stock in RBS is government owned, the remainder is not.
These minority shareholders have the right to have their interests
considered as well. If they do not have a cause of action against RBS,
the commercial, as well as the social, case for the creation of the GIB out
of RBS would need to be made. Again, the logic of enhanced shareholder
value is present. Of course the state could buy out the remaining
minority and have full control. Then, RBS would be free to do as its
controlling state owner wishes. However, the actual corporate
governance structure and mandate of UKFI suggests that such action is
impossible. The U.K. framework has not challenged the dominant
market-led model, though with political will it is easy to see how this
could change.
Turning to multinational SOEs, many of the new players in the
global economy are so constituted. For example, the national petroleum
companies of a number of developing countries are developing
international investment strategies. 116 The state-owned Russian energy
113. See JAMES LEATON, A BANK FOR THE FUTURE: MAXIMISING PUBLIC INVESTMENT IN A
Low-CARBON ECONOMY 20-22 (2010), available at http://www.wdm.org.uk/sites/
default/files/A%2OBank%20for%20the%2OFuture.pdf.
114. Id. at 15.
115. Id. at 29.
116. Examples include: Petrobras (Brazil 100% state owned), Pemex (Mexico 100%), and
Petroleos de Venezuela (100%). JEAN-PIERRE ANASTASSOPOULOS ET AL., STATE-OWNED
MULTINATIONALS 183-84 (Valerie Katzaros trans., 1987). See also LOUIS TURNER, OIL
COMPANIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 237-39 (3d ed. 1983); Oil's Dark Secret,
EcONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2006, at 67; Member Countries, OPEC.ORG,
http://www.opec.orglopec-web/en/aboutus/25.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) (listing
several developing countries as members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC)). The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is majority
state owned. Its state ownership was one of the reasons that the U.S. Congress was
concerned about its aborted takeover proposal of the U.S. oil company Unocal. See James
696 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2
and natural resources companies Gazprom and Rosneft are extending
their international operations. Similarly, Embraer of Brazil established
itself as an international aerospace company while in state
ownership.117 The state may be a useful partner when the private sector
is virtually nonexistent, as in developing countries or countries in
transition from a socialist command economy.118 However, the downside
is that state involvement may create the perception that the SOE is no
more than an arm of the home state. Thus, some see Gazprom and
Rosneft as instruments of Russian foreign policy. 119 This may
disadvantage the SOE commercially. For example, the state ownership
of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was
instrumental in stopping the company from bidding for a stake in the
U.S. oil and gas company Unocal. CNOOC took the unusual step of
filing a unilateral notice to the Committee for Foreign Investment in the
United States (CFIUS)120 without Unocal, which was by now committed
to a takeover by U.S.-based Chevron. CFIUS did not have to rule on the
bid because CNOOC decided to withdraw its bid in response to
Congressional pressure. 121 Fu Chengyu, the chair and chief executive of
CNOOC, has suggested that a reduction in the Chinese government's
Boxell & Kevin Morrison, Oil 'Majors' Find New Rivals Snapping at Their Heels, FIN.
TIMES (London), Dec. 8, 2004.
117. About Embraer, EMBRAER, http://www.embraer.comlen-US/ConhecaEmbraer/
tradicaohistoria/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2011). Embraer was founded by
the Brazilian government in 1969. It was privatized on December 7, 1994. Embraer
Timeline, EMBRAER, http://wwwl.embraer.com.br/timeline/english/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2011).
118. Developing countries may retain public ownership where the alternative is
domination of an industry by foreign capital. However, in the long term the pressures of
state control may force privatization to occur. Short of privatization, reforms aimed at
increasing managerial efficiency may be taken. See generally WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1983 (1983) (discussing the World Bank's financing programs with
developing countries); PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL
TRANSFORMATION (1995) (studying state involvement in promoting the computer
industries in Brazil, India, and Korea in the 1970s and '80s); ATUL KOHLI, STATE-
DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL POWER AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE GLOBAL
PERIPHERY (2004) (providing an analysis of the role of the state in industrialization of
developing countries).
119. See Ivan at the Pipe: Russia's Energy Firms are Viewed with Suspicion as They Try
to Expand in Former Communist Countries, EcONOMIST, Dec. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.economist.comlnode/3471333; Oil's Dark Secret, supra note 116.
120. CFIUS is charged with the reviewing of bids for U.S. companies involving national
security concerns under the Exon-Florio Amendment to the U.S. Defense Production Act
of 1950.
121. See EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, US NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 135-36 (2006).
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holding would combat claims that the company was an instrument of
government energy policy rather than a commercial company.122
Major issues of transnational corporate governance emerge from the
question of whether an SOE is a political or commercial entity. One
solution may be to view an SOE as no different than any other type of
MNE and expect the same standards of corporate governance and
responsibility. Indeed, the OECD Guidelines on MNEs make no
distinction between private or state-owned enterprises in regard to the
applicability of the norms they espouse. According to the current version
of the OECD Guidelines, MNEs
usually comprise companies or other entities established
in more than one country and so linked that they may
co-ordinate their operations in various ways. While one
or more of these entities may be able to exercise a
significant influence over the activities of others, their
degree of autonomy within the enterprise may vary
widely from one multinational enterprise to another.
Ownership may be private, state or mixed. 123
There is a certain symmetry between private and state-owned
MNEs insofar as both can own and operate a transnational enterprise
network and achieve a measure of autonomous power. They may also
create similar principal-agent problems as they conduct their internal
operations, as the issue of minority shareholders in U.K. state-
controlled banks shows. However, it is clear that state participation and
control creates greater political effects than those resulting from
interactions between private enterprises and between enterprises and
states.124 Thus, distinctive corporate governance and corporate
regulation laws may be needed to deal with multinational SOEs. In a
number of countries this is the case, though the main focus is on SWFs
rather than SOEs.125
In regard to corporate social responsibility, direct state participation
in business may allow for greater leverage over corporate activity in the
public interest, at least in relation to enterprises from accountable,
democratic countries. Such is the logic of the GIB proposal. By contrast,
enterprises from nondemocratic countries raise problems in this regard.
122. Francesco Guerrera & Richard McGregor, CNOOC Willing To Ask Beijing To
Reduce Stake, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 27, 2005, at 28.
123. OECD, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, at 12 (2008), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
124. See Cata Backer, supra note 2, at 69.
125. See id. at 74-85.
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They have no homegrown tradition of corporate responsibility. Yet,
when they venture abroad, different expectations may arise. Here, a
lack of openness and transparency that is acceptable at home may prove
wholly unacceptable.126 Equally, host countries may demand greater
commitments to corporate social responsibility. Some new players are
responding to these issues. For example, both Pemex of Mexico and
Petrobras of Brazil have strong commitments to social development
programs in their host country operations.127 Both firms come from
countries where civil society groups demand social responsibility and
where corporate cultures aspire to a level of global acceptance, as
witnessed by the fact that both firms are members of the U.N. Global
Compact.128 However, the issue remains alive for firms from other
countries where such social and cultural conditions do not exist. Failure
to respond and to operate in a socially responsible way could result not
only in bad publicity but also in the extension of public interest
litigation against such companies on the part of engaged lawyers and
civil society groups.
III. TOWARD A NEW MODEL OF TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL CORPORATE LAW?
The basic idea of a social model of corporate law is not new, nor is
the critique of excessive shareholder protection under the law.129 What
is new is the need to "resocialize" the corporation in the aftermath of the
neoliberal experiment and its collapse. This requires not only the return
to more stakeholder-oriented conceptions of corporate law and corporate
liability, but also a wider reorientation of international economic law
itself. The two can reinforce one another and ensure a more responsible
system of transnational business relations. In particular, as will be
argued below, BITs offer a way forward in this regard should the
political will exist to include a corporate responsibility element in their
provisions. The key to this process is the reassertion by the state of its
duty to protect weaker social groups and individuals from irresponsible
corporate power. To borrow a phrase from Ronald Reagan, "the market
126. WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2006, supra note 1, at 233.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., WALTER RATHENAU, VoM AKTIENWESEN: EINE GESCHAF'LICHE
BETRACHTUNG (1917). Rathenau developed the concept of the "unternehmung an sich"-
the idea that corporations exist beyond their members and managers and are intertwined
in the wider relations of society, thereby necessitating a broader set of goals than short-
term profit. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP: BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN RECENT
TIMES: THE CASE OF AMERICA 11-39 (Transaction Publishers 1997) (1923); THORSTEIN
VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 177-182 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers
1975) (1904).
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isn't the solution, it's the problem!" This is not to say that corporate law
should return to some kind of revival of state-centric corporatism; that
itself had been discredited as a policy tool by the end of the 1970s. 30
However, a recalibration of international economic and corporate law
geared toward a greater balance between facilitation and regulation of
global business appears essential.
Such a perspective requires a recalibration of corporate law in line
with wider stakeholder approaches to corporate governance. This
approach has an older pedigree than agency approaches, but it has had
little impact on contemporary regulatory developments.a13 Indeed, the
pressure on countries to adopt an Anglo-American enhanced
shareholder value model has been intense in recent years, representing
an integral part of the move toward the globalization of the neoliberal
economic model. 132 It has led some to assert the "End of History for
Corporate Law."133 With respect, history never ends, and with the global
economic crisis placing in doubt the social and economic utility of the
neoliberal project, the shareholder value model desperately needs to be
reformed. The wholesale abandonment of enhanced shareholder value is
rather unlikely given the embeddedness of the model in current
corporate law and because of the continuing need to address the agency
cost problem in modern corporations. However, the current model can
evolve into a more widely based stakeholder approach in which the
agency problems faced by shareholders will continue to be of
importance, but the definition of shareholder value may have to be
changed to allow for a more balanced consideration of all the classes of
persons and groups that can be affected by corporate action.
130. See, e.g., VEIAANOVSKI, supra note 112, at 48-49, 60 (discussing the failure of
nationalized industries in the United Kingdom).
131. See Thomas Clarke, Introduction: Theories of Governance - Reconceptualizing
Corporate Governance Theory After the Enron Experience, in THEORIES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 4-8, 10-
11 (Thomas Clarke ed., 2004). It should be noted that early English companies, such as
Cadbury, were set up by owners who sought to develop socially responsible businesses, in
this case to bring chocolate and barley-based products to the market as an alternative to
alcohol! See ANDREW SIMMS & DAVID BOYLE, EMINENT CORPORATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE GREAT BRITISH BRANDS 83-85 (2010).
132. See William Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New
Ideology for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & Soc'Y 13, 13-14 (2000).
133. "The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its
principal competitors is now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five
years ago. . . . We predict, therefore, that as European equity markets develop, the
ideological and competitive attractions of the standard model will become indisputable,
even among legal academics. And as the goal of shareholder primacy becomes second
nature even to politicians, convergence in most aspects of the law and practice of corporate
governance is sure to follow." Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 67-68.
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The key feature of the stakeholder approach is that it recognizes the
company as an institution rather than a bundle of assets, one which
must consider the needs not only of internal stakeholders, such as the
shareholders, managers, and employees, but also the external
stakeholders, such as customers, suppliers, competitors, and other
special interest groups. 134 Thus, a more socially rooted approach to
decision making is required. In turn, this demands governance laws
that permit a wider view to be taken. For example, continental
European models of corporate governance often allow for worker
participation in corporate affairs whether through works councils or the
use of codetermination laws that require a certain proportion of the
board to consist of worker representatives. 135 Under the Anglo-American
model, wider stakeholder interests can be introduced through the
appointment of suitable nonexecutive directors to the board.136 Equally,
the use of social accounting devices may assist.137 Arguably, English law
is beginning to do so through the so-called "enlightened shareholder
value" approach as exemplified by Section 172 of the Companies Act
2006, which, for the first time, accepts that directors may act in
furtherance of the success of their company by considering, among other
things, "172(1)(d) the impact of the operations on the community and
the environment."138 However, this is not a major change as Section 172
remains firmly focused on enhanced shareholder value in that the main
duties of the director are still to "promote the success of the company for
the benefit of its members as a whole." 139
Turning to international economic law, corporate responsibilities
could be included in international investment law instruments. For
example, corporate responsibility clauses could be introduced into future
BITs. The Norwegian draft BIT of 2007 Article 32 entitled "Corporate
Social Responsibility" states that the "Parties agree to encourage
investors to conduct their investment activities in compliance with the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and to participate in
the United Nations Global Compact."140
134. See R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future
Directions, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 409, 414, 417 (1994). See further R. EDWARD FREEMAN ET AL.,
STAKEHOLDER THEORY: THE STATE OF THE ART (2010).
135. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 11, at 354-59.
136. See id. at 342-49.
137. See id. at 375-82.
138. BRENDA HANNIGAN, COMPANY LAW 213 (2d ed. 2009).
139. Id. at 210. For further discussion, see id. at 211-18.
140. Agreement Between the Kingdom of Norway and [] for the Promotion and
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According to the Norwegian Government Commentary to the Draft
Agreement:
The obligation to comply with the OECD guidelines
applies primarily to countries outside the OECD area
since all OECD members as well as Argentina, Chile,
Brazil and Slovakia have committed themselves to
making such efforts. Norway has committed itself to
making the guidelines known in Norwegian commerce
and industry and to establishing a point of contact for
review of complaints in connection with allegations of
breaches of these guidelines by Norwegian companies.141
Apparently, this is the first express reference to corporate social
responsibility in any international investment agreement, though the
draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) did consider, as an
option, an annex including the OECD Guidelines. This clause
encourages investors to follow the OECD Guidelines and the U.N.
Global Compact. These instruments protect third party stakeholder
interests such as labor rights, human rights, and environmental
protection, as well as anticorruption. However, it is a best efforts
provision. It is not a binding investor obligation provision that could
form the basis of a claim by the host country on par with the investor
rights provisions.142 The Norwegian government did not adopt the
Norwegian model,143 but the mere fact that such a provision has been
included in a model BIT is itself highly significant and may indicate
that some countries are seriously considering a move toward a greater
balance of rights and obligations so that other stakeholder interests are
better protected. 144
141. COMMENTS ON THE MODEL FOR FUTURE INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS § 4.6.3 (Dec. 19,
2007) (Nor.), http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/NHDNedlegg/hoeringer/2008/
Forklarende%20vedlegg%20(engelsk)%20-%20final.doc.
142. For one possible model of such an approach, see Howard Mann et al., IISD Model
International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, 20 ICSID REV.
FOREIGN INV. L. J. 91 (2005), http://www.iisd.org/pdfl2005/investment modelint
handbook.pdf. For another model, see U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2003: FDI POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 155, U.N. Sales No. E.03.II.D.8 (2003).
143. See Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves Its Proposed Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty, INVEST. TREATY NEWS, June 2009, at 7, http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-
content/uploads/2009/06/ITN-June-2009.pdf.
144. Peter Muchlinski, Trends in International Investment Agreements: Balancing
Investor Rights and the Right to Regulate. The Issue of National Security, 2008-09 Y.B.
INT'L INV. L. & POL. 35, 48.
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In South Africa's continued review of its BITs, both the South
African Human Rights Commission and the Special Representative
have made submissions urging the government to use the review as an
opportunity to consider the human rights framework within which
investment issues operate. 145 In the words of Special Representative
Ruggie,
[RIecent experience suggests that some investment
treaty guarantees and contract provisions may unduly
constrain the host Government's ability to achieve its
legitimate policy objectives, including its international
human rights obligations. That is because under threat
of binding international arbitration, a foreign investor
may be able to insulate its business venture from new
laws and regulations, or seek compensation from the
Government for the cost of compliance. 146
Thus, the South African review is encouraged to explore ways in
which these various objectives can be reconciled. The starting point is
that human rights concerns should not be kept apart from wider
commercial policy issues, including investment. One response has gone
so far as to say that the South African government should "build its own
internal capacity and policy coherence on the topic of investment, taking
the protection and promotion of human rights and sustainable
development as the point of departure for all future policymaking."147 It
remains to be seen whether the South African government will go so far.
A possible outcome of such discussions might be the inclusion of a
human rights observance clause in BITs. This could ensure the direct
effect of corporate human rights responsibilities under international
145. See Peter Muchlinski, Trends in International Investment Agreements 2008-2009:
Review of the Model Bilateral Investment Treaties of Norway, South Africa and the United
States, 2009-10 Y.B. INT'L INV. L. & POL. 41, 68 (2010). See also Submission from the
South African Human Rights Commission ("the Commission") on the Department of Trade
and Industry's Draft Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review, at 1-3 (June
2009), http://www.reports-and-materials.org/SAHRC-submission-on-draft-bilateral-
investment-framework-Jun-2009.pdf; Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General, Statement of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and Other Business Enterprises to
the Department of Trade and Industry, South Africa (Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.reports-
and-materials.org/Ruggie-statement-to-S-Africa-Govt-re-review-of-BITs-4-Sep-2009.pdf.
146. Ruggie Report, supra note 92, 30.
147. JULIE MAUPIN & MALCOLM IANGFORD, SUBMISSION CONCERNING THE BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATY POLICY FRAMEWORK REVIEw GOVERNMENT PoslTION PAPER 4 (2009),
available at http://www.elaw.org/system/files/Comments+on+DTI+BITs+review+FINAL.pdf.
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law. Such a clause could offer protection for compliance to the investor,
with international human rights norms in their operations in the host
country, and make noncompliance the basis of a claim against the
investor by the host country or third parties directly affected by this.
Such a claim could be made subject to a prior duty on the part of the
third party to exhaust local remedies in the host country so that
international remedies would be used only as a last resort. A clause of
this type would undoubtedly meet strong corporate resistance on the
ground that it would divert BITs from their primary role as investor and
investment protection agreements. However, if adopted, it would
provide considerable strength to a more stakeholder-oriented approach
to corporate interests in international investment law.
In addition to BITs, other international economic policy instruments
could be used to further socially responsible corporate behavior. For
example, the state can use its control over export credit guarantees to
require corporate responsibility undertakings and impact assessments
as a condition for issuing political risk insurance. As a result of the
1999-2000 governmental review of its mission and status, the U.K.
Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) must now take into
account the contribution of an investment to sustainable development
and the promotion of human rights and good governance.148 MIGA also
requires corporate social responsibility assessments of proposed
insurance applications from foreign investors as a condition of obtaining
cover.149 It undertakes an environmental and social due diligence
148. See EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT [ECGD], ECGD'S BUSINESS
PRINCIPLES (2000) (U.K.), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://
www.ecgd.gov.uklecgdbusprinciples.pdf; ECGD, REVIEW OF ECDG's MISSIONS AND STATUS
(2000) (U.K.), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/tna/+/http://www.ecgd.gov.uk/




149. See MULTILATERAL INV. GUARANTEE AGENCY [MIGA], PoLcY ON SOCIAL &
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 2-3 (2007), http://www.miga.org/documents/environ-
socialreview_021507.pdf ("In its operations, MIGA expects clients to manage the social
and environmental risks and impacts of their projects. This entails the client's assessment
of these risks and impacts, and implementation of measures to meet the requirements of
the Performance Standards. An important component of the client's management of its
social and environmental performance is the client's engagement with the affected
communities through disclosure of relevant project information, consultation, and
informed participation."). Social and environmental assessment is based on MIGA's
standards. See MIGA, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY i (2007), http://www.miga.org/documents/performance_standards
social andenv sustainability.pdf (enumerating the Performance Standards as follows: (1)
Social and Environmental Assessment and Management Systems; (2) Labor and Working
Conditions; (3) Pollution Prevention and Abatement; (4) Community Health, Safety and
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assessment before approving cover.150 Other approaches can also be
used, such as developing a system that monitors and reviews corporate
action to see if actions are in line with emerging international standards
of corporate social responsibility and guidelines for MNEs.151 Finally,
the Special Representative has recommended the establishment of a
permanent office in the U.N. system to act as an advisory and capacity-
building body on business and human rights, advising states,
companies, U.N. organizations, and other national and international
entities that the Special Representative has said regularly seek his
advice regarding their own corporate-related human rights policies and
practices.152
CONCLUSION
This article has focused mainly on private corporate law liability
and accountability of transnational corporate actors. It locates this
specific legal issue within the changing climate of opinion and policy
relating to transnational corporate behavior. It calls for a reorientation
of corporate law away from the neoliberal conception of the "asocial
corporation" and the realization of the ideological goals of global
financialization and enhanced shareholder value, toward the older
tradition of the "socially embedded corporation." This is not the same as
a return to outright corporatism or state socialism. Rather, it is an
acknowledgement that some rebalancing between business facilitation
and accountability is needed. The neoliberal approach has
overemphasized facilitation over accountability.
The raising of accountability is occurring in diverse fora. This article
has noted the steps taken by civil society groups, legal activists, and the
harmed claimants who rely on their professional services, by way of
Security; (5) Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement; (6) Biodiversity
Conservation and Sustainable Natural Resource Management; (7) Indigenous Peoples;
and (8) Cultural Heritage).
150. See Environmental and Social Impact Assessments, MIGA.oRG, http://www.miga.org/
policies/indexsv.cfm?stid=1655 (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (outlining specific project
information and providing due diligence assessments).
151. See, e.g., OECD Guidelines, supra note 123; HM GOVERNMENT, THE UK NATIONAL
CONTACT POINT FOR THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2009),
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file53566.pdf.
152. Business and Human Rights, supra note 90, 1 125-26; see also U.N. Special Rep.
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights & Transnational Corporations &
Other Business Enterprises, Recommendations on Follow-up to the Mandate (Feb. 11,
2011), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/medial documents/ruggie/ruggie-
special-mandate-follow-up-11-feb-2011.pdf (suggesting the establishment within the U.N.
system of a "Voluntary Fund for Business and Human Rights").
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bottom-up recourse to existing legal devices and remedies, with the
development of foreign direct liability. Such "subaltern legality" has
created a demonstration effect that spurs on new initiatives in countries
where such liability is yet to be determined. This bottom-up approach is
complemented by the top-down approach of the U.N. Special
Representative, who argues for corporate responsibility to respect
human rights, supported by a state duty to protect human rights and
promote effective remedies. In addition, the state is beginning to return
as an active participant in global business and as a possible broker for
corporate responsibility, at least in democratically accountable and
socially responsible states. Should they wish, states can use their power,
as owners and operators of SOEs, to control the tools of transnational
economic ordering to enhance a new social corporate law. In addition,
they may use their regulatory powers to introduce new forms of
corporate responsibility in international economic law instruments and
institutions. Thus, the process of "resocializing" the corporation can
occur both at the national and transnational levels, which, as has been
argued, are interlinked and complementary and which together are
capable of building the new socially responsible transnational corporate
governance.

